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2 December 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Hal Ford
NIO at Large

FROM: George Kolt
NIO for Europe

SUBJECT: Input for NIC Strategic Outlook

1. The President's handling of the Summit has won near unanimous approval in Europe. At the same time the comments of a number of European leaders were shaped both by the desire to praise the President and by underlying concerns about how the new East-West atmosphere would affect their own interest:

- Kohl stressed the utility of his government's advice to the US Administration in bringing about a successful Summit and emphasized the new possibilities that have opened for the INF negotiations.
- Likewise Foreign Minister Tindemans emphasized how the Summit has made possible a separate INF deal.
- As is her wont, Thatcher gave unabashed support to the President but was probably also dismayed by the prominent play given by British TV to US critics of the President's policies, for instance former Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara and Salt II negotiator Paul Warnke.
- Craxi balanced his praise of the President with a personal message of congratulations to Gorbachev--a measure seemingly designed to please his Foreign Minister Andreotti.
- Mitterrand underlined his independence from superpower dealings by staying away from the President's NATO briefing and holding a press conference devoted primarily to domestic issues on the day of that briefing. Mitterrand further underlined his independence by balancing his

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approval of the Summit results with a reaffirmation that any US-Soviet understandings will have no affect whatsoever on French strategic policy. Mitterrand's underlying fear may be that his European allies could pressure France to place limits on its Strategic Nuclear Force in order to make possible an INF agreement.

2. In the coming months European leaders will probably be paying particular attention to:

- the extent and effectiveness of the probable Soviet drive to portray SDI as the obstacle to any further progress.
- The tendency of many in Europe to see Gorbachev not only as a different type of Soviet leader, but also as one who is "better for Europe".
- The impact of European press speculations--supported by the solicited comments of former US officials--that the US military-industrial complex will lobby hard against any arms reduction agreements.
- Any signs of a competition developing among themselves to create separate "detentes" with Moscow, and domestically, pressures by parties out-of-power to push governments in that direction. As could be expected, Brandt and the SPD in Germany were quick to state that the Europeans must now do their own talking with Moscow.

3. In sum, the Summit surprised many European critics by demonstrating the validity of the President's approach to the Soviet Union. At the same time it has not resolved--and could not have been expected to resolve--the underlying difficulties in managing the Alliances approach to East-West relations.

/s/
George Kolt